



MACHINE  
GUN  
EMPLACEMENT

AMERICAN RED CROSS

At approx 1730 Sunday Cpl. White & I returned from mission observed fire on N.B. emp. outside west of our perimeter. This was the same emp. which had been causing wire crews trouble during the morning. ~~As I~~ <sup>some</sup> ~~heard~~ <sup>heard</sup> our perimeter coming back infantry men <sup>told</sup> us to be careful going in as the Japs were firing on our perimeter. This was only occasional firing, for I noticed none for some minutes after my return. Immediately on my return I secured a couple of canteens and filled them with water from the creek which formed the eastern boundary of the main pass. There was no firing then. ~~Just then~~ <sup>at 1800</sup> Adamshi - Wilson and myself then began our evening meal. firing broke out now and then (increasing in intensity until we at last abandoned our meals. The Jap artillery piece (or pieces since it seemed to be more than one) and mortars began opening up at the same time (as nearly as I could place it) <sup>at</sup> 1800.) I saw T 5 White, Pvt Rich and Pvt Spalding start for the East flank of the pass <sup>most of the firing came from there</sup>. All infantry men not on radios or C.P. work also were picking positions on the perimeter. Firing by this time was a roar of sound. I <sup>stayed</sup> at my radio but was given no traffic to clear. <sup>Wilson came to our radio shack</sup> <sup>sometime later</sup> told us that the Inf. Co. had given orders to be prepared to blow up our radios and that we were to secure grenades for this

Went to our 610 and placed it near our 284  
so that it would be  
easier to destroy, and  
then

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purpose! I went over towards the C.P. intending  
to get grenades, but could not find any, so I  
went back and secured all the papers - mag  
books - brevity codes + s.o.s. from our radio Sta.  
I was confused and would have thought at that  
time to take 209 cid. also.

When I returned to the C.P. area <sup>she order</sup> and  
infantry radio op. gave myself and ~~another~~  
man grenades to toss in at their sets.  
I threw the papers into the hole and we  
tossed our grenades, scrambling onto the beach  
to escape their effects. At this point I saw  
Sgt. Riffle. He only exchanged a few <sup>irrelevant</sup> words  
~~"friendly but short"~~, but I got the impression <sup>was</sup>  
how that he was looking for Capt. Carter. Men  
were screaming for ammo + medical attention.  
I believe these were the first of a Co. to get  
back into the perimeter. There was a great deal  
of confusion, and I could find no grenades, so I  
crawled back to our radio hut and fired  
two shots into each of the radio <sup>610 + 284</sup>  
and then backed away again towards the C.P. <sup>present</sup>  
Lt. Fearman, naked, was ~~there~~ <sup>at the C.P.</sup> now ~~getting~~ <sup>giving</sup> things  
like "We've got em boys - give me  
a phone". It didn't look like we had anybody to  
she, but ~~she~~ <sup>she</sup> ~~later~~ <sup>later</sup> ~~gave~~ <sup>gave</sup> ~~me~~ <sup>me</sup> ~~confidence~~ <sup>confidence</sup>  
communication Sgt. from the Inf. and find a phone which  
got ammo switchboard. - This was the under-  
water line. ~~At the~~ Lt. Fearman called for J.D.C. and  
got it very quickly. He explained in short sentences  
what he wanted in the way of fire and asked

"To furnish volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of armies . . . . . and "To act in matters of voluntary relief and in accord  
with the military and naval authorities as a medium of communication between the people of the United States of America  
and their Army and Navy . . . . ." The Charter of The American National Red Cross. By Act of Congress, January 3, 1905.



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how much ammo was on hand, I explained to him that I was an artillery man and would handle the phone and he could go down to the beach and observe. This arrangement was carried out until the third round was fired. The line went dead before we got "On the way" for this round.

<sup>insect</sup>  
By this time a great number of men were on the beach retreating from all sides of the perimeter, but mostly from the left flank - the side where a Co. came in. The men were milling around in confusion. I could hear officers yelling "Get back on that left flank" and other commands, but the men seemed too dazed to obey, until a Sgt. (someone told me his name, but I don't remember it) stood up on the crest of the beach and yelled "Are we a bunch of cowards? Lets go get the yellow bastards" or words similar to those, and started to the perimeter. A great many of the men followed him up. It is only a surmise, but this line of men walking up from the beach <sup>seemed to have</sup> a great deal to do with the Japs eventually falling back. They must have <sup>been</sup> like a fresh company landing reinforcements

Capt. Pearlstein came over then (I had been with Capt. Carter until that time I believe) and suggested that we go to the other end of the perimeter and tap <sup>some</sup> ~~some~~ lives there as some of them may have only been out by the intense fire. He strapped a phone around my waist & we started out to try, Sgt. Fearman with us.

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H. Fearman stayed on the beach, as his naked body made too good a target in the bright moon, and Pearlstein and I crawled up towards the center of the village. Pearlstein made the first try jumping up to catch a line (they were overhead through the village), but when he came down he held the smoky end of the line in his hand, and even though we crawled around we could not find the other end - it was combat wire and hard to locate. Somewhere during this bout Pearlstein, I tried one more line on the center path of the village, but the line was dead. After looking but not finding other mines I backed off to the beach just in time to see H. Fearman swimming out to sea. I had come back to the C.P. Port Spad of the white? ~~two of~~

~~I~~ were just coming back to get more ammo and a drink if possible. The firing had decreased by this time. I went back with them and we took up positions under a hut just behind ~~and~~ between two m.g.s which were on the creek line towards the front. The night was a successful night. Time was about 2130. There was activity on the center of the perimeter during the night, but all was ~~fairly~~ quiet near us. Wilson, Richardson and I were there.

In the morning I went back to the C.P. to see if there were any orders. Capt. Coater was on a phone sending office commands. He said he had no need for us, so I went back and we moved to another hut and ate some rations. An infantry officer came over and told us to take up positions



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in and aside of the mg. emplacements ~~and~~  
the creek. ~~At that~~ There were the m.g. crews,  
a couple of medics and all of our artillery  
men except Capt. Carter + Sgt. Riepl at this  
position then. Sgt. Riepl came over (some time  
after ten I think it was) and said that we were  
going to be evacuated. I went over to the G10  
set and removed the crystals, then asked Capt.  
Carter if we should try to get the rest of the  
equipment to the beach. He said to not make  
any move that would give away the fact that  
we were pulling out. Some infantry officers,  
with unnecessary roughness, I thought, ordered  
me back to the perimeter. I went and got  
in a hole with White and Rich. When the  
signal to leave came the snatching group fled  
out first and then the rest of us hatched off  
to the beach.

The radios were undoubtedly destroyed  
too early, although at the time the order was  
given things did look extremely bad.

Wires were a hopeless tangle all being  
tied in at one tree and becoming torn out and  
twisted in the confusion. If the lines had  
been more orderly and not concentrated it is  
just possible that we might have had communication  
a short time longer.

Ammo supplies were not in readiness at  
the beginning of the engagement, and enough  
personnel was not left to distribute it.